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Abstract 
The spate of corporate failures in recent times calls for serious examination of their causes and possible solution. 
Audit committees are statutorily compulsory component of the management of corporate organizations in 
Nigeria (CAMA 1990) and constitute a credible component of corporate government element. For quite some 
time now, audit committees have been instituted to add teeth to corporate governance in publicly quoted 
companies. In spite of this, corporate failures are still rampant. It becomes necessary to ask: how significant is 
the contribution of the audit committees to corporate performance of quoted companies in the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange. The earlier study had used opinion survey through a structured questionnaire administered on 
company administrators and managers to evaluate the relevance of the audit committee on corporate 
performance and   discovered that the quality of audit committee rather than its mere existence impacts on the 
performance of companies through a positive impact on corporate governance. This current  study  uses 
secondary data on corporate financial performance represented by earnings per share; as dependent variable and  
Audit Committee sizes, Composition,  frequency of meetings ,and regularity of members’ attendance, as 
independent variables, all collected from annual financial reports of the companies quoted on the stock exchange 
within the study period to test the hypothesis that : Audit Committee size, composition and frequency of 
meetings have  significant positive effect on the financial performance of quoted non financial companies on the 
Nigerian Stock Exchange. The Micro soft Special Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) is used to do the 
regression analysis which showed that there is a significant positive relationship between the Audit Committee 
Size , composition, frequency of meetings, regularity of members’ attendance   and performance of quoted non 
financial companies as in the earlier study on perception. Most of the companies had very low financial 
performance and had ineffective Audit Committees. This study could not simply corroborate the earlier one 
because while the perception of the managers reflected their expectations of the role and impact of the audit 
committees, the reality on ground as shown by the relationship between the quality of audit committee and 
financial performance show that Nigerian companies have not really benefited from the existence of these audit 
committees. Critically, these firms generally score very low in these indices hence their equally low earnings per 
share. Therefore, like in the previous study the recommendation is being made that  the entire legal and 
regulatory framework together with the necessary institutional and environmental architecture for proper 
constitution and operation of an efficient Audit Committee should be maintained at all times to enhance 
corporate governance and improve financial performance of listed companies on the Nigerian Stock Exchange. 
Keywords: Audit Committee, Corporate Governance, Control, Corporate Performance 
 
1.INTRODUCTION 
Basically the Boards of Directors and their committees rely on management to run the daily operations of the 
business. They are professional managers who (Wikipedia, 2007) are considered more competent than the 
owners of the corporations and are thus hired to run and manage the affairs of the companies and are expected to 
guarantee transparency accountability and fairness in their duties (Howard, 2000).  But the Board's role is better 
described as oversight or monitoring, rather than execution. Same applies to its other committees including the 
Audit Committee. It is the basic tenet of corporate governance which ensures that various mechanisms are put in 
place to ensure seamlessness in accommodating corporate goal (ownership goal) and management goal in an 
enterprise. The corporate governance structure specifies the distribution of rights and responsibilities among 
different participants in the firm including spelling out the rules and procedures for making decisions. Hence 
Wolfenson (1999), Uche (2004) and Akinsulire (2006) all agree that corporate governance provides the structure 
through which the company’s objectives are set and the strategies, the tactics and the means, of attaining those 
objectives and monitoring performance defined. Manne (1965) however, set the tone which was later made 
louder by Alchian and Demetz (1972) and Bonnier and Bruner (1989) to the effect that the Board of Directors 
(BOD) is the most important and possibly, the greatest beneficiary of all good mechanisms of internal control 
including corporate governance. However, there are other mechanisms of corporate governance, especially the 
audit committee, that play vital roles in ensuring smooth and efficient management and administration of 
companies. After all, according to Williams (2001), all stakeholders responsible for promoting sound corporate 
governance such as the board, the management, the audit committee and regulators are almost equally 
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challenged by the recent failures in corporate governance in Nigeria and should be compelled to ensure that 
sound corporate governance exist. According to CAMA 1990, the audit committee is a committee of 
shareholders and non-executive directors charged with the responsibility of liaising between the external auditors 
and the BOD on one hand, and between management and the external auditors on the other hand. The inclusion 
of this committee in the corporate governance mechanism raises the expectations of shareholders and the general 
public for enhanced corporate governance and by extension increased performance of companies.  This raised 
confidence is predicated on perceived checkmating role of the Audit Committees in ensuring that the BOD lives 
up to expectation in fulfilling the globally accepted pillars of corporate governance, to wit, accountability, 
fairness, responsibility and transparency. But the rampant failure of corporate governance in Nigeria as 
manifested in corporate failures throw strong doubt on the effectiveness of audit committees in carrying out this 
role. Companies have gone under at alarming rate in Nigeria in recent times and while external factors 
(economic infrastructure especially power, legal architecture, fiscal policies et cetera) may not have been 
exonerated, much blame is on absence of strong commitment to the tenets of corporate governance of which 
Audit Committee is a critical element. Cadbury Plc, Nigerian Railway Corporation (NRC), National Electric 
Power Authority (NEPA), Kaduna Textile Industry, Asaba Textile Industry, Nigerian Telecommunications 
Limited (NITEL) Benue Cement Company Gboko, Niger Cement Company Nkalagu, Nigerian Coal 
Corporation (NCC), Leventis Plc, et cetera and several banks are some of the corporate failures in recent time in 
Nigeria for which strong questions have been raised on the failure of corporate governance. A logical question 
that arouses the curiosity of this researcher becomes: to what extent does audit committee positively impact on 
corporate governance and financial performance of companies in Nigeria? Since the first leg of this study 
addressed this question by evaluating the perceived impact of audit committee on corporate performance in 
Nigeria, this second aspect addresses the same question by evaluating the actual impact of the audit 
characteristics on the financial performances of these companies through testing of the hypothesis that there is no 
significant positive impact of audit committee on corporate performance in Nigeria. The paper is organized in 
five parts. . Part one of the paper introduces the work, part two contains the literature review, part three the 
methodology, while part four presents and discusses the findings and part five concludes. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 AUDIT COMMITTEE 
Basically the Boards of Directors and their committees rely on management to run the daily operations of the 
business. Hence the Board's role is better described as oversight or monitoring, rather than execution. In the 
same vein, the audit committee which is more or less an organ of the board has the responsibilities of that 
include:  
• Overseeing the financial reporting and disclosure process. 
• Monitoring choice of accounting policies and principles. 
• Overseeing hiring, performance and independence of the external auditors. 
• Oversight of regulatory compliance, ethics, and whistleblower hotlines. 
• Monitoring the internal control process. 
• Overseeing the performance of the internal audit function.  
• Discussing risk management policies and practices with management (Wikipedia 2011). 
Generally the duties of an audit committee are described by statutes in different countries or in a committee 
charter of respective organizations. In the European Union, the Directive 2006/43/EC article 41.2 of the 
Company Law stipulates that the duties of the audit committee shall include; (a) Monitor the financial reporting 
process; (b) Monitor the effectiveness of the company's internal control, internal audit where applicable, and risk 
management systems; (c) Monitor the statutory audit of the annual and consolidated accounts; (d) Review and 
monitor the independence of the statutory auditor or audit firm, and in particular the provision of additional 
services to the audited entity. According to CAMA 1990, the audit committee is a committee of shareholders and 
non-executive directors charged with the responsibility of liaising between the external auditors and the BOD on 
one hand, and between management and the external auditors on the other hand. Audit Committees are the most 
important recent development in the corporate governance structure and are expected to contribute significantly 
in this respect. Shamusdden (2003) opines that members of the committee should possess qualities such as 
integrity, dedication, and a thorough understanding of the business of the company. Moreover, the composition 
of the Audit Committee (AC) and the manner in which they exercise their governance and oversight 
responsibilities have a major impact on the overall internal control mechanism of a company. Expectedly, the 
independence of the AC from management, the level of accounting knowledge possessed by members, the 
experience and status of the members, the extent of their involvement and scrutiny of management activities, the 
appropriateness of their actions (for instance, the degree to which they raise and pursue difficult questions with 
management), all determine the efficiency and effectiveness of this committee. As an intermediary between the 
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting                                                                                                                                    www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online) 
Vol.4, No.16, 2013 
 
127 
management and the external auditors, it is equally expected that an effective audit committee can enhance the 
independence and professional skepticism of an external auditor. Interestingly, the BOD and the AC exist in a 
mutually reinforcing symbiotic relationship. The effectiveness of one enhances the efficiency of the other since 
an effective AC helps to set a positive tone at the top. Hence AC is responsible for reviewing its own company’s 
business activities to identify inefficiencies, reduce costs and otherwise achieve organizational objectives. It is 
generally accepted that Audit Committees may investigate potential theft or fraud and ensure compliance with 
applicable regulations and policies. In this regard, they assist in risk management as they are essentially 
independent from any management being answerable only to the board of directors. The Audit committee is also 
seen as a subcommittee of the corporation’s board of directors that selects the firm’s external auditors. Therefore 
it may as well be responsible for hiring the auditors, resolving disputes with the auditors and evaluating and 
disclosing the auditors’ reports. That is, it liaises between the company’s management, the board of directors, 
internal and external auditors, and any other accounting experts advising the company on audit issues.  
In particular, the relationship between the AC and the external auditor is such that the later should evaluate the 
effectiveness of the former as part of understanding the control environment and monitoring quality in the 
enterprise. Hence in evaluating the overall internal control efficiency in the company, the external auditor 
considers among other things; the independence of the AC from management; the clarity with which the AC’s 
responsibilities are articulated; how well the AC and management understand those responsibilities; the AC’s 
involvement and interaction with the independent auditor; the AC’s interaction with key members of financial 
management team; whether questions raised by the AC indicate an understanding of the critical accounting 
policies and judgmental accounting estimates; and the AC’s responsiveness to issues raised by the auditor. To 
the auditor therefore, Arens et al (2009), insist that ineffective oversight by the AC of the company’s external 
financial reporting should be regarded as at least, a significant deficiency and a strong indicator of a material 
weakness in internal control and corporate governance. In the same vein, the Nigerian Securities and Exchange 
Commission delists any company with an AC that: is not comprised solely of independent directors; is not solely 
responsible for hiring and firing of the company’s auditors; does not establish procedures for the receipt and 
treatment of complaints (e.g.  whistle blowing) regarding accounting, internal control or auditing matters; does 
not have the ability to engage its own independent counsel and other advisor; and is inadequately funded. 
2.2 Earnings per share (EPS)  
An earnings per share is the portion of the company’s distributable profit which is allocated to each outstanding 
equity share (common share). It is a very good indicator of the profitability of any organization, and it is one of 
the most widely used measures of profitability. The EPS is a useful measure of profitability, and when compared 
with EPS of other similar companies, it gives a view of the comparative earning power of the companies. EPS 
when calculated over a number of years indicates whether the earning power of the company has improved or 
deteriorated. Investors usually look for companies with steadily increasing earnings per share. Growth in EPS is 
an important measure of management performance because it shows how much money the company is making 
for it’s shareholders, not only due to changes in profit, but also after all the effects of issuance of new shares (this 
is especially important when the growth comes as a result of acquisition). The EPS is calculated by dividing net 
profit after taxes and preference dividends by the number of outstanding equity shares. This can be expressed in 
terms of the following formula: Earnings per share = (Net Profit after Taxes – Preference Dividends) / Number 
of Equity Shares. If the capital structure changes (i.e. the number of shares changes) during the reporting period, 
a weighted average number of equity shares is used for the calculations of EPS. The diluted earnings per share 
(Diluted EPS) expands on basic EPS and includes the shares of all convertible securities if they were exercised. 
Convertible securities are convertible preferred shares, stock options (usually employee based), convertible 
debentures and warrants. It should be noted that two different companies could generate the same EPS but one 
could do so with a lesser equity. All other things being equal, this company is better than the other one because it 
is more efficient at using its capital for generating profits. 
According to Wikipedia (20011), various consulting and public accounting firms have at different times, though 
mostly outside Nigeria (with the exception of the first part of this current work), performed survey researches on 
audit committees: their sizes, and other basic characteristics, and provided data on which subsequent researches 
are currently benchmarking. Some of the major findings run thus: 54% of committee members surveyed felt the 
audit committee was "very effective," while 38% indicated "somewhat effective";  Risk management, internal 
control, and accounting estimates and judgments were the top priority areas for audit committees in 2007;  Most 
audit committees have 3-4 members and are usually chaired by persons with experience as a CFO, external 
auditor, or CEO; Audit committees meet 6-10 times per year, either face-to-face or via teleconference, with the 
former lasting from 1–4 hours and the latter 1–2 hours; Audit committee members devoted 50–150 hours to their 
responsibilities each year; The percentage of audit committees with oversight responsibility for: IT compliance 
(66%), business continuity (50%), and information security(45%);  41% were "very satisfied" with the internal 
audit function, while 52% were "somewhat satisfied"; Two-thirds felt the Chief Internal Audit position was for a 
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professional internal auditor, rather than as a "stepping stone" to other roles; 93% indicated the audit committee 
was "somewhat" or "much more" effective since the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was implemented in 2002; 58% of 
committee members were "somewhat satisfied" that they understood management's processes to identify and 
assess significant business risks; Only 17% of audit committees had primary responsibility for oversight of non-
financial risk; the full board had this responsibility in 56% of companies. Wikipedia (2011) also shows that in a 
2011 study, the Council of Europe concluded that: “The Benchmarking results from a sample of 15 international 
organisations in Europe show that 11 have an audit committee (of which the name may vary from Audit 
Committee, Advisory Committee on Audits, Audit Advisory Board, Audit Progress Committee, Finance and 
Audit Committee, Independent Advisory Oversight Committee, Independent Audit Advisory Committee of 
Experts) and in seven, the Audit committee plays a role in the selection of the External Auditor". And a 2009 
study on 23 international organizations showed that 10 had an Audit Committee and 3 considered having one in 
future, with 8 reporting to the Governing Body level and 2 reporting to DG/Executive Director level. The sizes 
of all Audit Committees were between 3 and 9 members, with 5 committees having a mix of external expert 
members and internal members. 
2.3  ROLE OF AUDIT COMMITTEES IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
Ideally, audit committees review financial reports. This may be done quarterly, semi-annually or annually.  
Where the committee members are accounting or auditing experts, it is expected that they robustly discuss the 
accounting policies and assumptions underlying the management actions in preparing the financial reports.  They 
also try to appraise and evaluate management’s compliance with statutory and regulatory provisions. In the 
process, the audit committee provides a platform for meaningful interface with Chief Finance Officer and/or 
Controller of finance. The committee performs an oversight role on the external auditors who report to them on a 
variety of issues such as views on management’s selection of accounting principles, accounting adjustments, 
disagreement or difficulties encountered in working with management, including any identified fraud or illegal 
act. Essentially, the audit committee approves the selection of the external auditor. According to the European 
Union (2006), "In a public-interest entity, the proposal of the administrative or supervisory body for the 
appointment of a statutory auditor or audit firm shall be based on a recommendation made by the audit 
committee. The statutory auditor or audit firm shall report to the audit committee on key matters arising from the 
statutory audit, and in particular on material weaknesses in internal control in relation to the financial reporting 
process." The audit committee also plays the oversight roles of regulatory compliance, monitoring the 
effectiveness of the internal control process and of the internal audit, and oversight of risk management. In 
playing these roles, the corporate governance tone of the entity is strengthened. Corporate governance is 
synonymous with the responsibility associated with large scale artificial persons that lack the capacity to manage 
themselves (Salomon v Salomon and CO ltd, 1897). By vesting the day to day running of the entity to a team of 
directors and senior managers who are distinct from their owners, ownership becomes divorced from 
management necessitating the guarantee for transparency, accountability and fairness in the management of the 
enterprise. Mayer, (2000) opines that corporate governance is about control and running of companies where 
concerns are raised as to who is in control, for how long and over what activities? Deakin and Hughes (1997) 
posit that corporate governance entails the connection between the internal control machinery of corporations 
and the general public’s notion of the scope of corporate accountability. Hence, it is a set of rules applicable to 
the direction and control of companies where however, management is seen to connote running a business and 
governance becomes ensuring that it is run properly (Tricker, 1984). Specifically, corporate governance creates a 
framework of goals and policies to guide an organization’s progress and forms a foundation for assessing Board 
and management performance (Adedotun, 2003). In a more elaborate tone, Oyediran (2003) stresses that 
corporate governance looks at the institutional and policy framework for management of corporation from the 
very beginnings, in entrepreneurship, through the government structures, company law, privatization, insolvency 
and to market exit. It not only depends on the legal, regulatory, institutional, environmental and societal interests 
of the communities in which it operates, but also has impact on the reputation and long-term success of a 
company. Much of efficient corporate governance also depends on the efficiency and effectiveness of internal 
control within the organization. After all; fraud, misappropriation, theft, waste of resources and non respect of 
the rights of all stakeholders are evidences of both weak internal control and poor corporate governance. And it 
is in response to the rise in fraud cases that the US Congress developed recommendations aimed at improving 
the effectiveness of the audit committee in publicly held companies in the United States. According to Securities 
Exchange Commission (SEC) (2003) the US Congress Report (2002), demands in addition to the independence 
of the members of the audit committees, that companies should disclose whether or not the audit committees 
include financial experts (and, if not, why not). A study carried out by Sarens et al (2009), concludes that 
financial expertise and the independence of audit committee members improve their effectiveness in reducing 
the likelihood of misappropriation of assets and overall tone of corporate governance in publicly held companies 
in the US. Along the same line, Moriceau (2004) and Chapple et al (2009) conclude from their separate studies 
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also in the US, that the higher the percentage of independent members, the greater the effectiveness of the audit 
committee, and the longer the average tenure of audit committee members, the lower the incidence of 
misappropriation of assets. In addition, continue Chapple et al, the proportion of independent directors on the 
audit committee is inversely related to the incidence of misappropriation. 
According to Sezoort and Salterio (2001), and McDaniel et al (2002), financial expertise impacts audit 
committee member’s judgments and financial reporting-related outcome. Again experts tended to focus more on 
recurring, prominent issues. Xie et al (2003) examined the relationship between discretionary accruals as proxy 
for earnings management, and the background of audit committee members. They found that the proportion of 
audit committee members with corporate or investment banking background is negatively related to the level of 
earnings management. Hence an active and financially oriented audit committee may influence the level of 
earnings management and lower it drastically to the benefit of other stakeholders. This is undoubtedly a positive 
influence on corporate governance. Interestingly again, Abbot et al (2004) examined the impact of audit 
committee financial expertise on financial restatements while defining financial expertise to include certified 
public accountants, investment bankers, venture capitalists, chief financial officers, controller or someone who 
has held a senior management position with financial responsibilities, and found that firms with financial experts 
on the audit committees are less likely to experience financial reporting restatement. Even more acutely, Bedard 
et al (2004) found that the presence of at least one financial expert is negatively associated with aggressive 
earnings management. Just the same way as Agrawal and chadha (2005) found that the probability of restatement 
of financial statement is significantly lower when the audit committee has financial experts. Much of creative 
accounting could therefore be minimized by the presence of a credible audit committee composed by financial 
experts. In addition, Defond et al (2005), examined the ideal composition of audit committees and found that a 
favorable market reaction occurs whenever there is an announcement of the appointment of directors who are 
accounting experts, especially when other good governance attributes exist.  
 In any case, no empirical evidence has been established in Nigeria to the knowledge of these researchers as to 
the exact impact of audit committee composition on corporate governance and corporate performance. After all, 
corporate governance in Nigeria within the concept of company management and administration is seen as the 
exercise of power over the enterprise direction, the supervision and control of enterprise actions, the concern for 
the effect of the enterprise on other parties, the acceptance of a duty to be accountable and self-regulated within 
the status and jurisdiction of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. From the prism of the overall rights of 
shareholders to specific equitable treatment of marginal and minority shareholders which adequate corporate 
governance is expected to protect and guarantee, an oversight functioning body such as the Audit Committee 
should be a critical factor. The need for the Audit Committee to discharge its functions credibly as provided in 
the SEC’s Code of best practices of Corporate Governance (2003) should demand independent, accounting-
knowledge compliant or broadly defined financial experts, external directors and shareholders, non-
compromising and alert members to constitute the Audit Committee.   
 Little wonder that the Code inter alia, provides for the existent of audit committees (compulsorily for large 
firms), the separation of the roles of Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of the BOD; determination of 
Executive Directors’ compensation by non-executive directors; schedule of matters reserved for the Board; the 
exclusion of non-executive directors in share option schemes and pension arrangements with the company; the 
establishment of a formal selection process for the appointment of non-executive directors as a matter for the 
entire board; disclosure in annual reports including Directors’ Reports on the effectiveness of the company’s 
system of internal control and the going concern status of the business. On its part, the CAMA i990 provides 
specifically that a public limited liability company should have an audit committee (maximum of six members of 
equal representation of three member each representing the management/directors and shareholders) in place. 
The Act goes further to assign responsibilities to the audit committee as follows;  working to ensure increased 
public confidence in the credibility and objectivity of published financial statements; assisting the directors, 
especially the non-executive directors, in meeting their responsibilities of financial reporting; and strengthening 
the independent position of a firm’s external auditors by providing an additional channel of communication. The 
functions assigned to the audit committee in the Act include the provision of oversight functions on effective 
internal control, reliable financial reporting, which must comply with regulatory requirements and corporate 
code of conduct. Audit committees are also expected to review not only external auditor’s reports but also the 
report of the internal auditor. In addition the committee is to maintain a constructive dialogue with external 
auditors and the board in order to enhance the credibility of financial disclosures. Therefore, a properly 
constituted audit committee that is both efficient and effective is expected to impact positively on both corporate 
governance and financial performance of a company.  
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3.METHODOLOGY 
The paper is an ex-post factor research. Secondary sources of data on the performances of the companies are 
used for analysis. This study uses secondary data on corporate financial performance proxy: earning per share, 
dividend per share, and price earnings ratio; as dependent variables. Audit Committee sizes, composition, 
frequency of meetings, and regularity of members’ attendance, are the independent variables. All the data are 
collected from annual financial reports of the companies quoted on the stock exchange within the study period to 
test the hypothesis that : Audit Committee size, composition and frequency of meetings have  significant positive 
effect on the financial performance of quoted non financial companies on the Nigerian Stock Exchange. A total 
number of 108 quoted companies being the actual number in the list during the period, cutting across 
AGRICULTURE/AGRO-ALLIED 4 , AUTOMOBILE & TYRE 2, AVIATION 2, BREWERIES 3,  
BUILDING MATERIALS 4, CHEMICALS & PAINTS 9, COMPUTER & OFFICE EQUIP 3, COMMERCIAL 
SERVICES 4, CONGLOMERATES 8, CONSTRUCTION 7, CONSUMER GOODS 14, FOOT WEAR & 
ACCESSORIES 1, INDUSTRIAL DOMESTIC PRODUCTS 7, INFORMATION COMMUNICATION TELL 
3, LEASING 3, MEDIA 2, PACKAGING 3, PETROLEUM MKT 7, PRINTING & PUBLISHING 3, REAL 
ESTATE 1, REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT 1, ROAD TRANSPORT 1, TEXTILES 1, EMERGING MKT 2, 
HOTEL AND TORISM 3, and HEALTH 10 is used. The Micro soft Special Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) 
is used to do the regression analysis.  
 
4.DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS (FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION) 
Table 4.1 presented in the appendix shows the corporate performances of non financial companies quoted on the 
Nigerian Stock Exchange and their corresponding Audit Committee characteristics. 
Table 4.1 shows the financial performance of the 108 non financial companies quoted on the Nigerian stock 
exchange between 2006 and 2012. Apparently almost all the quoted companies have Audit Committee. The size 
ranges from 2 to 7 with majority of the companies having just two member audit committee. Critically most of 
the audit committees are composed of directors and mostly executive ones. Outsiders are usually very few with 
majority of them having only one outsider member of the audit committee. It becomes difficult under such 
circumstance to appoint members based on ideal qualities of expertise especially in Accounting and Financial 
studies, experience, integrity, honesty and professionalism. Again the table shows that majority of the companies 
had very low financial performance going by their earnings per share, dividend per share and price earnings 
ratio. Notably, the companies have been categorized into their various sections and it is seen that those in the 
petroleum, consumer goods and conglomerates in that order outperformed the rest with the exception of the real 
estate investment company with a high earning per share and another company in the media though with a high 
earning per share but had not yet declared any dividend. Interestingly, these companies whose actual identities, 
like the rest have not been disclosed appear to have a better corporate governance indices of higher audit 
committee membership, frequency of holding and attending meetings and inclusion of relevant professionals in 
the committee more than others. However, the actual impact of these Audit Committee characteristics is better 
appreciated from the result of the test of hypotheses. 
The main hypothesis of the study is that: Audit Committee size, composition and frequency and regularity of 
meetings have significant positive effect on the financial performance of quoted non financial companies on the 
Nigerian Stock Exchange. This is simplified into four hypotheses thus; 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: CORPORATE FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE PROXIED BY: 1. EARNING PER 
SHARE (EPS)  
       INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: 
1. AUDIT COMMITTEE SIZE (ACS) 
2. AUDIT COMMITTEE COMPOSITION(ND) 
3.  FREQUENCY OF MEETINGS(FM) 
4. REGULARITY OF MEMBERS’ ATTENDANCE(RA) 
 Table 4.2 Model Summary of Regression Analysis with EPS dependent on ACS, ND,FM and RA. 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .608a .369 .343 2.63334 .369 13.766 4 94 .000 
a. Predictors: (Constant), RA, ND, FM, 
ACS 
      
b. Dependent Variable: EPS       
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Table 4.2 shows the result of the test of the hypothesis is significant at 0.000 signifying that the dependent 
variable EPS is significantly affected by the independent variables. Hence the EPS of quoted companies in 
Nigeria is influenced by positive characteristics of the audit committee such as a large size, inclusion of more 
external and financially literate members, frequency of holding meetings and regular attendance at meetings by 
all members. 
Table 4.3 ANOVA Result of the regression test. 
ANOVAb 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 381.826 4 95.457 13.766 .000a 
Residual 651.840 94 6.934   
Total 1033.666 98    
a. Predictors: (Constant), RA, ND, FM, ACS    
b. Dependent Variable: EPS     
Table 4.3 shows that the result is robust and significant with an F value of 13.766 which is higher than 2 and 
significant value of 0.000 far lower 0.05. The mean Square value of the regression is 95.457 with a residual of 
only 6.934 which shows that a very significant proportion of the change in the dependent variable is as a result of 
the effects of these independent variables and neither due to chance nor any other extraneous variable. 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
T Sig. 
95% Confidence 
Interval for B Correlations 
B 
Std. 
Error Beta 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Zero-
order Partial Part 
1 (Constant) -12.985 4.400  -2.951 .004 -21.722 -4.248    
ACS .604 .622 .265 .971 .334 -.632 1.840 .567 .100 .080 
ND .148 .784 .051 .188 .851 -1.409 1.704 .553 .019 .015 
FM 1.047 .515 .295 2.031 .045 .024 2.069 .508 .205 .166 
RA .105 .046 .208 2.311 .023 .015 .196 .198 .232 .189 
a. Dependent Variable: 
EPS 
         
To determine the relative importance of the significant predictors, we look at the standardized coefficients. As 
the composition represented by number of non-executive directors (ND) 0.051, has a smaller coefficient 
compared to the size of the audit committee (ACS) 0.265, it contributes less to the model as well. Interestingly, 
the frequency of holding meetings by the audit committee has the highest influence of all the predictors. It has a 
value of 0.295. The result therefore, shows that Frequency of meetings, audit size, regularity of attendance to 
meetings and number of non-executive directors; in that order make greater contribution to earnings per share of 
quoted companies on the Nigerian Stock Exchange. 
 
5.CONCLUSION  
This work shows that the Audit Committee in Nigeria is seen from a very narrow prism. It is merely a 
‘’Committee of Directors’’ and the enterprise’s shareholders representatives whose specific responsibility is to 
review the annual financial statements before submission to the board of directors.  This contrasts with what 
obtains in the United States’ publicly quoted companies. For instance, in a U.S publicly traded company, an 
audit committee is an operating committee of the Board charged with oversight of financial reporting and 
disclosure, (Wikipedia 2011). It continues that Audit committee members are drawn from members of the 
company’s board of directors, with a Chair person selected from among the committee members. Moreover, a 
qualifying audit committee is required for a U.S. publicly traded company to be listed on a stock exchange and it 
is typically empowered to acquire the consulting resources and expertise deemed necessary to perform their 
responsibilities. In addition, the role of audit committee had continued to evolve as a result of the passage of the 
Sarbanese –Oxley Act of 2002 enabling them to have oversight of regulatory compliance and risk management 
activities. Again the Institute of Internal Auditors sees audit committee as the governance body that is charged 
with the organizations audit and control functions. By that, they perform fiduciary duties delegated to them by 
the board in much the same way as trustees, legislative bodies, internal control committees, or full boards of 
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting                                                                                                                                    www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online) 
Vol.4, No.16, 2013 
 
132 
directors (IIA Practice Advisory 2060-2 of 2004). Little wonder that there is the narrow membership, the 
infrequency of meetings and the rampant absenteeism by committee members. Importantly, the government 
auditors in the INTOSAI’s Internal Control Standards had even expounded the audit committee’s role beyond 
focusing on aspects of financial reporting as in Nigeria or even the entity’s processes to manage business and 
financial risk as in the USA to include compliance with significant applicable legal, ethical, and regulatory 
requirements. Thus the audit committee ideally assists the board with the oversight of (a) the integrity of the 
entity’s financial statements, (b) the entity’s compliance with legal and regulatory requirements, (c) the 
independent auditor’s qualification and independence, (d) the performance of the entity’s internal compensation 
of company executives (in the absence of a remuneration committee (INTOSAI, 2011). Had the role of the audit 
committee in Nigeria been seen to encompass as much, greater attention would not only have been paid to its 
size but also to regularity of meetings, composition of the committee and attendance to meetings.  
With regards to composition, while in the USA,  a properly constituted audit committee regarded as a qualifying 
audit committee must be composed of independent outside directors with at least one qualifying as a financial 
expert, in the European Union, the 8th Directive on Company Law 2006/43/EC states ‘’Each public- interest 
entity shall have an audit committee. The Member State shall determine whether audit committees are to be 
composed of non-executive members of the administrative body and/or members appointed by the general 
meeting of shareholders of the audited entity. At least one member of the audit committee shall be independent 
and shall have competence in accounting and/or auditing’’. Furthermore, the Institute of Internal Auditors’ best 
practice says ‘’the audit committee will consist of at least three and no more than six members of the board of 
directors. Each committee member will be both independent and financially literate. At least one member shall 
be designated as the ‘’financial expert’’, as defined by applicable legislation and regulation’’. In Nigeria the 
situation about composition is very far from these provisions as shown on table 4.1 in appendix.  
The content analysis confirms a strong relationship between the role and functions of a properly constituted audit 
committee and the corporate governance and performance of listed companies on the Nigerian Stock Exchange. 
However, empirical evidence from secondary data on the size of audit committee and regularity of audit 
committee members’ attendance to meeting failed to show any significant impact. The implication is that audit 
committees of these companies are yet to rise to be properly constituted and effective in the oversight function 
over the accounting and auditing functions of these companies. Though in compliance with statutory and 
regulatory provisions, the companies have audit committee members constituted by mainly shareholders and 
non-executive directors, the other qualities of would be members are not sufficiently considered. Hence not all 
the audit committees have proven financial competence, integrity, experience and availability as basic criteria for 
selection of their membership. The BOD in practice does not properly constitute the audit committee 
membership. The board is said to have influenced greatly, the appointment of audit committee members even 
when the exercise is done at the floor of the Annual General Meeting of the company. This practice is inimical to 
proper functioning of an audit committee and the result is a rubber-stamp kind of audit committee. Under the 
prevailing circumstance therefore, the audit committee can hardly function properly to impact positively on both 
good corporate governance and financial performance of the company it is meant to serve. An efficient Audit 
Committee is a sin qua non to proper accountability, transparency and hence good corporate governance. 
Appointment of members should be devoid of political or selfish interests as the overall maximization of 
shareholders wealth should be the overriding objective in constituting the membership of Audit Committees. The 
independence and integrity of the audit committee directly influences the independence and objectivity of the 
external auditor and rubs off positively on the confidence of present and potential investors in the company. This 
paper again recommends that the entire legal and regulatory framework together with the necessary institutional 
and environmental architecture for proper constitution and operation of an efficient Audit Committee should be 
maintained at all times to enhance corporate governance and improve financial performance of listed companies 
on the Nigerian Stock Exchange. 
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Appendix 
Table 4.1 Average Corporate performances of non financial companies quoted on the Nigerian Stock Exchange 
and their corresponding Audit Committee characteristics. 
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S/
N 
Company Audit 
Committe
e 
Size 
 Non 
Director
s 
No of 
Meeting
s per 
year 
Average 
Attendance 
to meetings 
% 
Dividen
d per 
Share(D
PS) 
Earning
s per 
Share 
P.E. 
Ratio 
 AGRICULTURE/AGR
O-ALLIED 
       
1 1 3 1 4 80 0.50 6.06 3.20 
2 2 3 1 4 76 0.50 1.88 3.90 
3 3 3 1 5 80 0.30 0.03 16.67 
4 4 2 0 3 80 0.03 0.01 4.30 
 AUTOMOBILE & 
TYRE 
       
5 5 2 1 3 75 0.15 0.00 0.00 
6 6 3 1 3 80 1.10 0.16 10.31 
 AVIATION        
7 7 3 1 3 76 - 0.80 7.25 
8 8 4 2 3 88 0.15 0.51 3.82 
 BREWERIES        
9 9 6 3 5 80 10.00 12.16 16.86 
10 10 5 2 5 72 1.25 4.39 19.36 
11 11 4 2 4 75 0.08 0.00 0.00 
 BUILDING 
MATERIALS 
       
12 12 3 1 4 85 0.30 1.35 11.41 
13 13 6 3 5 75 2.25 7.19 13.35 
14 14 4 2 4 80 0.04 1.45 4.55 
15 15 3 1 4 80 0.25 0.87 45.40 
 CHEMICALS & 
PAINTS 
       
16 16 4 2 4 80 0.70 1.81 5.17 
17 17 3 1 3 78 0.45 0.00 0.00 
18 18 3 1 3 70 0.10 0.00 0.00 
19 19 5 3 4 85 2.00 1.69 11.78 
20 20 2 0 4 80 - 0.00 0.00 
21 21 2 0 3 90 0.02 0.00 0.00 
22 22 2 0 2 85 0.07 0.00 0.00 
23 23 2 0 2 86 0.06 0.16 4.44 
24 24 2 1 3 88 0.12 0.29 17.62 
 COMPUTER & 
OFFICE EQUIP 
       
25 25 2 0 2 80 0.11 0.00 0.00 
26 26 4 2 3 85 3.00 7.13 0.73 
27 27 3 1 3 80 - 0.04 12.50 
 COMMERCIAL 
SERVICES 
       
28 28 4 2 3 88 0.30 0.54 4.28 
29 29 3 1 3 80 0.05 0.04 12.50 
30 30 3 1 3 75 0.05 0.10 36.30 
31 31 3 1 3 75 0.10 0.03 28.00 
 CONGLOMERATES        
32 32 5 2 4 80 0.12 0.28 6.79 
33 33 5 2 3 80 0.10 0.00 0.00 
34 34 6 3 4 89 0.86 1.29 23.68 
35 35 4 2 3 78 0.10 0.05 122.2
0 
36 36 6 3 4 85 1.30 6.87 4.56 
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37 37 5 2 4 84 1.10 1.38 19.93 
38 38 3 1 3 85 - 0.22 3.45 
39 39 3 1 3 85 0.10 0.34 18.91 
 CONSTRUCTION        
40 40 2 0 3 86 0.10 0.00 0.00 
41 41 2 0 3 88 0.20 0.00 0.00 
42 42 3 1 3 90 2.00 3.15 14.97 
43 43 3 1 3 80 0.20 0.00 0.00 
44 44 3 1 3 90 0.50 3.66 1.54 
45 45 2 0 2 88 0.01 0.01 50.00 
46 46 3 1 3 88 0.50 4.50 21.22 
 CONSUMER GOODS        
47 47 5 2 4 90 2.00 3.81 12.60 
48 48 cad 6 3 4 90 1.30 0.36 36.84 
49 49 6 3 4 90 2.00 4.50 13.00 
50 50 4 1 3 87 0.50 0.73 5.73 
51 51 6 3 4 95 10.60 16.18 24.99 
52 52 4 1 4 86 0.50 1.52 26.90 
53 53 3 0 2 89 0.03 0.06 84.33 
54 54 4 1 4 90 0.90 2.09 10.28 
55 55 4 1 4 90 0.60 0.71 9.58 
56 56 6 3 4 88 0.50 0.54 11.76 
57 57 3 1 3 78 0.06 0.01 50.00 
58 58 3 1 3 75 0.20 0.00 0.00 
59 59 3 1 3 70 0.13 0.26 10.28 
60 60 3 1 3 72 0.03 0.00 0.10 
 FOOT WEAR & 
ACCESSORIES 
       
6
1 
61 2 0 3 78 0.15 0.19 18.3
2 
 INDUSTRIAL 
DOMESTIC 
PRODUCTS 
       
62 62 3 1 3 90 0.36 0.89 7.82 
63 63 3 1 3 80 0.30 0.70 8.50 
64 64 3 1 2 80 0.20 0.00 0.00 
65 65 2 0 2 85 0.05 0.00 0.00 
66 66 2 0 2 86 0.05 0.29 38.45 
67 67 - - - - - - - 
68 -68 - - - - - - - 
 INFORMATION 
COMMUNICATION 
TELL 
       
69 69  0 2 88 0.00 - - 
70 70 2 0 2 95 0.03 0.00 0.00 
71 71 - - - - - - - 
 LEASING        
72 72 2 0 2 88 0.00 0.00 0.00 
73 73 2 0 2 85 0.00 0.00 0.00 
74 74 3 1 3 90 0.08 0.20 8.55 
 MEDIA        
75 75 2 0 2 90 - 0.00 0.00 
76 76 5 3 4 94 10.00 - - 
 PACKAGING        
77 77 3 1 3 89 0.36 1.81 8.18 
78 78 3 0 2 90 0.13 0.07 42.29 
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79 79 3 1 3 90 0.20 1.36 11.05 
 PETROLEUM MKT        
80 80 6 4 5 90 5.20 0.00 0.00 
81 81 6 4 5 85 1.00 2.38 16.03 
82 82 6 3 4 86 0.08 0.00 0.00 
83 83 7 4 5 90 7.00 13.68 10.31 
84 84 7 4 5 95 8.28 15.44 14.79 
85 85 6 3 4 90 0.01 0.03 19.33 
86 86 7 4 5 95 18.35 0.86 0.49 
 PRINTING & 
PUBLISHING 
       
87 87 3 1 3 80 0.50 0.65 11.65 
88 88 3 1 3 78 0.40 0.37 16.65 
89 89 3 1 3 86 0.70 0.33 11.15 
 REAL ESTATE        
90 90 4 2 3 84 0.50 1.24 13.87 
 REAL ESTATE 
INVESTMENT 
       
91 91 5 3 4 96 97.00 10.61 9.14 
 ROAD TRANSPORT        
92 92 4 1 2 87 0.03 0.01 69.00 
 TEXTILES        
93 93 3 1 2 90 0.10 0.00 0.00 
 EMERGING MKT        
94 94 - - - - - - - 
95 95 - - - - - - - 
 HOTEL AND 
TORISM 
       
96 96 2 0 2 88 0.10 0.96 2.36 
97 97 - - - - - 0.00 0.00 
98 98 2 0 2 86 0.07 0.22 34.09 
 HEALTH        
99 99  0 2 85 0.03 0.00 0.00 
10
0 
100 2 1 2 97 0.15 0.15 48.27 
10
1 
101 2 0 2 89 0.03 0.00 0.00 
10
2 
102 4 2 3 96 1.20 2.55 10.59 
10
3 
103 3 1 2 90 0.40 0.18 16.61 
10
4 
104 3 1 2 96 0.50 0.07 16.86 
10
5 
105 2 0 2 88 0.20 0.00 0.00 
10
6 
106 2 0 2 90 0.10 0.21 5.19 
10
7 
107 2 0 2 97 0.08 0.00 0.00 
10
8 
108 2 1 2 95 0.50 0.25 8.50 
SOURCE: Nigerian Stock Exchange Annual Reports several years. 
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting                                                                                                                                    www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online) 
Vol.4, No.16, 2013 
 
138 
 
Coefficient Correlationsa 
Model RA ND FM ACS 
1 Correlations RA 1.000 -.052 .400 -.156 
ND -.052 1.000 -.200 -.855 
FM .400 -.200 1.000 -.242 
ACS -.156 -.855 -.242 1.000 
Covariances RA .002 -.002 .009 -.004 
ND -.002 .614 -.081 -.417 
FM .009 -.081 .265 -.078 
ACS -.004 -.417 -.078 .388 
a. Dependent Variable: EPS    
 
Residuals Statisticsa 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value -1.2656 7.0642 1.5849 1.97388 99 
Std. Predicted Value -1.444 2.776 .000 1.000 99 
Standard Error of Predicted 
Value .291 1.033 .568 .166 99 
Adjusted Predicted Value -1.3166 7.7065 1.5914 1.98068 99 
Residual -6.20425 10.91421 .00000 2.57904 99 
Std. Residual -2.356 4.145 .000 .979 99 
Stud. Residual -2.475 4.280 -.001 1.015 99 
Deleted Residual -6.84647 11.63875 -.00643 2.77079 99 
Stud. Deleted Residual -2.546 4.744 .007 1.056 99 
Mahal. Distance .204 14.098 3.960 2.914 99 
Cook's Distance .000 .243 .015 .042 99 
Centered Leverage Value .002 .144 .040 .030 99 
a. Dependent Variable: EPS  
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